Kristie Madsen v. Kory Pasquin : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Kristie Madsen v. Kory Pasquin : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert H. Copier; Attorney for Appellant.
David W. Steffensen; Richard L. King; Debbie A. Robb; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Kristie Madsen v. Kory Pasquin, No. 20000979.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/625
Case No. 20000979-SC 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the matter of the 
ESTATE OF KORY PASQUIN, Argument Priority 15 
Deceased. 
Appeal from Amended Final Judgment on Kristie Madsen's 
petition filed in an informal probate to have her child Karly Madsen, 
a minor child, named as a child and heir of the late Kory Pasquin. 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, Presiding 
THE ESTATE'S REPLY BRIEF 
ROBERT H. COPIER, 727 
Attorney for Candance M. Souter 
Personal Representative 
Estate of Kory Pasquin 
Respondent/Appellant 
200 Metro Place 
243 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803 
Telephone (801) 531-0099 FILED 
JUL 2 7 2001 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No. 20000979-SC 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the matter of the 
ESTATE OF KORY PASQUIN, Argument Priority 15 
Deceased. 
Appeal from Amended Final Judgment on Kristie Madsen's 
petition filed in an informal probate to have her child Karly Madsen, 
a minor child, named as a child and heir of the late Kory Pasquin. 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, Presiding 
THE ESTATE'S REPLY BRIEF 
ROBERT H. COPIER, 727 
Attorney for Candance M. Souter 
Personal Representative 
Estate of Kory Pasquin 
Respondent/Appellant 
200 Metro Place 
243 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803 
Telephone (801) 531-0099 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Authorities i 
Reply Argument 1 
Conclusion 25 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980) 16 
Matter of the Estate of Christensen. 655 P.2d 646 (Utah 1982) 1,2 
Matter of the Estate of Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 1992) 1 
Matter of the Estate of Ouinn. 830 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1997) 13,17 
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990) .....18 
Geri Pasquin v. Estate of Kory PasquinT et al. cert denied, 
January 26, 2000 Utah Supreme Court Docket No. 990823 20 
Rehn v. Rehn. 974 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1998) 19 
State Dept. of Social Services v. Woods, 
742 P.2d 118 (Utah App. 1987) 25 
Wilde v Wilde 969 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1998) 24 
STATUTES 
UCA Sec. 30-3-3 19 
UCA Sec. 75-1-310 9,16 
UCA Sec. 75-2-114..„„„„„„.10,12 
UCA Sec. 78-45a-4 1,11 
UCA Sec. 78-45a-5(4) 9, 11,12 
UCA Sec. 78-45a-9 16 
RULES 
CJA 4-508 6 
SCRPC 3.3(a)(3) 5 
URAP 33 6,7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
REPLY ARGUMENT 
POINTONE 
The Supreme Court's dismissal "without prejudice" of the "Pasquin I" 
appeal is dispositive of the issues raised by the Madsens in points 1,2,4, 
5,6, and 7 of their brief and the Supreme Court should award damages 
to the estate against the Madsens and/or their counsel for their failure to 
disclose "existing law" adverse to their position to the Supreme Court. 
"Pasquin I" was concluded by having the Supreme Court decide 
whether the first appeal herein should be dismissed "without prejudice" as 
was contended by the estate or "with prejudice" as was contended by the 
Madsens. In urging the Supreme Court to dismiss "Pasquin I" with prejudice, 
the Madsens raised or could have raised the same points they now raise in 
points 2,4, 5,6, and 7 of their current brief. The Supreme Court rejected all 
the Madsens' contentions and dismissed the first appeal "without" prejudice. 
Thus, points 1,2,4, 5,6, and 7 were all previously decided on appeal. 
Utah has effectively adopted a "pragmatic case-by-case approach to 
finality in probate matters." In the Matter of Estate of Morrison. 933 P.2d 
1015 (Utah App. 1997) (Paragraph 4). The question of whether an order 
entered during an ongoing probate is final and appealable turns on whether 
the order "resolved an issue of vital importance" and "concluded a major 
phase" in the probate. In re Estate of Christensen. 655 P.2d 646 (Utah 1982). 
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The test that is applied to determine whether an order entered in an 
ongoing probate is final and ripe for appeal is whether or not the "failure to 
allow an appeal from such an order could compel all subsequent proceedings, 
including partial distributions, to go forward under a cloud of uncertainty that 
would seriously impair the personal representative's efforts to administer the 
estate." In re Estate of Christensen. supra., (such as the order appealed in 
"Pasquin I" in which the probate court awarded "half the estate to Karly 
Madsen even though the Madsens had proffered no pleading or proof limiting 
the children to two and there were, in fact, more than two children). Under 
the "pragmatic" approach taken in Utah, it made sense to appeal that order, 
since the claim by the Madsens to "half the estate was completely untenable 
and the probate court's order granting them same needed to be subjected to 
appellate review before the personal representative could prudently proceed 
with the probate. But once a stipulation was reached that would allow an 
amended order on that issue to be entered in the probate court, it made sense 
under the "pragmatic" approach to have the first appeal dismissed "without 
prejudice" so there could be some further proceedings in the probate court. 
Using the "pragmatic" approach taken in Utah, the probate court once 
again took jurisdiction after the dismissal of the appeal "without" prejudice. 
-2-
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A subsequent "Amended Final Judgment" was then timely appealed. 
Since the prior appeal was dismissed "without prejudice" and since the 
"Amended Final Judgment" thereafter entered by the trial court is now before 
this court on a timely appeal, this court has jurisdiction over the "Pasquin I" 
issues dismissed "without prejudice" and over all new issues that since arose. 
Under Utah's "pragmatic" approach, there was also no need to review 
attorneys' fees on appeal until the Amended Final Judgment was entered and 
appealed, since the probate court might well have modified its earlier award 
based on the change in the operative facts of the case, reduction in the share 
of the estate distributed to Karly Madsen, and because one matter in which 
Karly Madsen had previously prevailed had now been completely reversed. 
(One of the reasons remand is needed is to allow the trial court to enter 
findings of fact showing why she did not modify the earlier fee award at all.) 
To briefly review the "Pasquin I" appeal history, it should be noted 
that a main issue involved the Madsens' contention that Karly Madsen was 
entitled to "half of the estate. The estate had timely objected to that part of 
the court's final judgment in the probate court since nothing had been pled by 
Karly Madsen in her petition or proved by her at her trial to show that Kory 
Pasquin had only two children. While "Pasquin I" was on appeal, the mother 
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of Kory Pasquin's third known child came forward and petitioned the probate 
court to have her child recognized as a child and heir. In response, the estate 
pointed out that such an eventuality was the very reason the estate had elected 
to appeal the order awarding "half of the estate to Karly Madsen. In a most 
predictable way, Karly Madsen formally opposed the petition of this third 
child's mother. Even though her attorneys call her a "little girl" engaged in a 
"four year battle to be recognized as the heir of her father" (Appellee's Brief, 
P. 9), this "little girl" was more than happy to oppose the efforts, of another 
child's mother once the shoe was suddenly on the other foot. Her overly-
dramatic self-misrepresentation as a little child victim involved in a battle is 
hardly supported by the record. She has been fully recognized as an heir by 
the estate for quite some time now, and the only matter that remains in dispute 
is the fee and cost award of over $45,000 her lawyers want in a simple case 
where there was already a DNA test in place before they were ever retained. 
As a practical matter, all they had to do was either call a competent 
foundational witness as to the existing DNA test or get a new court-ordered 
DNA test, but elected to do neither and now want to get $41,212.50 in fees. 
Judge Lewis declined to hear the petition of this third child's mother, 
since the Madsen petition was on appeal. The stipulation for a dismissal 
-4-
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without prejudice ofthe'Tasquinl" appeal was then entered into. Karly 
Madsen's position on appeal had become completely untenable even to her. 
Since there was no pleading or proof that there were only two children, 
and since the third child was already attempting to be recognized as an heir, 
Karly Madsen was simply not going to be able to hang onto "half of the 
estate on appeal and there was likely going to be a remand so that the claim 
of the third child could be adjudicated in the probate court. "Pasquin I" was 
thus dismissed without prejudice. The points now raised by the Madsens 
concerning jurisdiction, the stipulation, and the various species of waiver and 
estoppel were all raised by the Madsens and rejected by the Supreme Court in 
"Pasquin I" and there is still no merit to the Madsens' contention that the 
estate agreed to abandon anything dismissed "without prejudice" in "Pasquin 
F' or that any species of waiver or estoppel somehow arose under this history. 
Rule 3.3(a)(3) of the Supreme Court's Rules of Professional Conduct 
provides for "candor toward the tribunal" and required the Madsens' counsel 
to duly "disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction 
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and 
not disclosed by opposing counsel." Counsel for the personal representative 
did not disclose the decision in "Pasquin I" in the estate's opening brief for 
-5-
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purposes of refuting the contentions now made by the Madsens in points 1, 2, 
4, 5,6, and 7 of their current brief because the estate could not reasonably 
have anticipated such a frivolous and meritless attempt to raise issues already 
decided in the first appeal. Since it was the Madsens who raised points 1, 2, 
4, 5,6, and 7, they should have disclosed in their brief both the fact that all of 
these points were already raised by them and rejected by the Supreme Court 
in "Pasquin I" and that the Supreme Court's order in "Pasquin I" is "existing 
law" that controls these issues of law and is adverse to their clients' position. 
The Supreme Court's dismissal order in "Pasquin I" was unpublished 
and "unpublished orders" constitute existing law with "precedential value... 
in the courts of this state... for purposes of applying the doctrine of law of 
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel." (CJA 4-508) And since the 
Supreme Court's order in "Pasquin I" constitutes "existing law" as to this 
case, the raising of points 1, 2,4, 5,6, and 7 coupled with the failure to make 
the required disclosure of existing law contrary to the position taken renders 
appellee's brief a "frivolous brief under URAP 33. It is not warranted by 
"existing law" (the order entered in "Pasquin I" by the Supreme Court). 
The estate requests appropriate damages under URAP 33 determined 
after it is seen whether the Madsens now persist in points 1, 2 ,4 , 5,6, and 7. 
-6-
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POINTTWO 
This appeal involves only the award of "attorney's fees and costs" to the 
Madsens'attorneys. The status of Karly Madsen as a child of the late 
Kory Pasquin IS NOT at issue. The claim made in appellees' brief that 
"issues regarding paternity" are argued in addition to "attorney's fees 
and costs" is frivolous. Damages should be awarded under URAP 33. 
The two issues argued on appeal are (1) whether there is any statutory 
basis for an attorney fee award in a paternity adjudication made for purposes 
of intestate succession and (2) whether the fee and cost award is excessive. 
The Madsens have made the false representation in their brief that the 
estate "argues issues regarding paternity and the award of Karly's attorney's 
fees and costs" on this appeal. (Brief of Appellees, P. 26, emphasis added). 
The reasonableness of the fee and cost award in the context of probate 
court paternity proceedings and lack of adequate findings of fact justifying the 
large fee and cost award are argued in the estate's brief with some references 
to what was actually done on in the probate court. But Karly Madsen's status 
as a child of the late Kory Pasquin is not raised, disputed, or argued by the 
estate. The Madsens' brief is "frivolous" under URAP 33 in that it makes a 
material misrepresentation that is not "grounded in fact" herein. The estate 
requests damages under URAP 33. The degree, nature, size, and scope of 
sanctions should be determined after it is seen whether the Madsens persist in 
-7-
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their claim that the estate "argues issues regarding paternity . . . " or whether 
they promptly concede that only "attorney's fees and costs" are at issue on 
appeal with a court filing that corrects the false statement made in their brief. 
The Madsens do correctly point out that the estate raised not only the 
attorney fee award, but also $3,933.25 in costs awarded to Karly Madsen as 
an appeal issue. The probate court already reduced costs claimed by Karly 
Madsen by over $800 to get to the $3,933.25. The remaining $3,933.25 is 
excessive. Since Kristie Madsen never named Kory Pasquin as the father in 
the birth certificate during Kory Pasquin's lifetime, and since he had expressly 
denied paternity during his lifetime even after the DNA test results had been 
provided, the estate's reasonable position below was that a minimum amount 
of foundational evidence and testimony should be introduced by the Madsens 
at trial in order to have paternity facts decided by the jury, not by the personal 
representative. Some witness fees are, thus, proper. But it appears that the 
Madsens could have proceeded via a subpoena with a standard fact witness 
fee, since DNA testing had already been purchased. If the testing providers 
demanded payment beyond that, the court might have ordered payment to be 
limited to necessary court time by witnesses previously paid to perform DNA 
testing. A remand will allow for the entry of adequate findings on all of this. 
-8-
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POINT THREE 
The Utah Uniform Probate Code contains no provision allowing 
attorney's fees to be claimed as part of the costs in this case, but allows 
only costs to be claimed. UCA Sec. 75-1-310 (1996) (R. 664) 
Kristie Madsen did not name Kory Pasquin as the father of her child in 
the birth certificate (R.29) either before or after his death. Nor did she file a 
paternity action against Kory Pasquin during his lifetime. After his death, she 
still did not file a paternity action against his estate seeking amounts accrued 
prior to his death and such sums as may be payable for dependency. Instead, 
she only filed a petition within the informal probate of his estate seeking to 
establish a parent-child relationship for purposes of intestate succession only. 
The Utah Uniform Act on Paternity in the Judicial Code provides: 
78-45a-4. Limitations on recovery from father's estate. 
The obligation of the estate of the father for liabilities 
under this act are limited to amounts accrued prior to 
his death and such sums as may be payable for depen-
dency under other laws. UCA Sec. 78-45a-4 (2001) 
The sole statute cited by appellees in the probate court and in point 3 
of their brief in support of an attorney fee award is UCA Sec. 78-45a-5(4). 
That statute does not apply to intestate succession because it is part of 
the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity, it is not part of the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code, and the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity comes into play only because 
-9-
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I 
< 
UCA Sec. 75-2-114 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code now makes reference 
generally to the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity and expressly to the genetic 
testing provisions therein and states that the "parent child relationship may be 
established as provided" therein. Establishing a parent-child relationship 
i 
under the Utah Uniform Probate Code for purposes of intestate succession is 
very distinct from a paternity action. Under intestate succession in Utah, a 
parent can inherit by intestate succession from a deceased child. A living 
child could inherit under intestate succession from his or her deceased 
parent's ancestors. In all such cases, the reference to the Utah Uniform Act 
on Paternity appearing in the Utah Uniform Probate Code at UCA Sec. 75-2-
114 means the parent-child issue may be resolved using genetic testing under 
the procedures set forth in Title 78, Chapter 45a, but it does not mean that the 
parent of a deceased child could collect support or attorney's fees under the 
Utah Uniform Act on Paternity from the deceased child's estate or that a child 
of a deceased parent could collect support or attorney's fees from a parent's 
ancestor's estate any more than Karly Madsen can now use the Utah Uniform 
Act on Paternity as a vehicle for recovering attorney's fees in this probate. 
The issue of Karly Madsen's status as a biological child of the late 
Kory Pasquin was adjudicated for intestate succession purposes only. The 
-10-
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reference in the Utah Uniform Probate Code to the genetic testing chapters in 
the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity contains no attorney fee award language. 
And if Karly Madsen were to now bring a paternity action against the 
estate for child support liabilities under the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity 
and it did not violate the time for bringing such an action under the applicable 
statute of limitations, the case would still be limited by UCA Sec. 78-45a-4. 
It is also important to recognize even in a paternity case against a living 
father where fees are awardable under UCA Sec. 78-45a-5(4), which is the 
sole attorney's fee statute relied upon by appellees below and in their point 3 
here, the fee award is not mandatory, but is discretionary and very limited. 
UCA Sec. 78-45a-5(4) states as follows: 
78-45a-5. Remedies. (4). The court may enter an order 
awarding costs, attorney fees, and witness fees in the 
manner prescribed by Section 30-3-3 upon a judgment or 
acknowledgement of paternity. UCA Sec. 78-45a-5(4) (2001) 
By referencing Section 30-3-3 (divorce), the Utah Uniform Act on 
Paternity brings to bear divorce attorney fee law, meaning attorney's fees 
under the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity are in substance a form of support 
and alimony (subject to the same analysis of financial need, ability to pay, and 
the incomes of living parents as is applied to a support and alimony analysis.) 
-11-
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Thus, such a fee award does not fit into intestate succession at all. 
If the inheritance were a large one, then there would be no need on the 
part of the recipient heir, because the heir could pay a reasonable attorney's 
fee out of the inheritance. (And the estate would lack the ability to pay 
because it would be an empty vessel after inheritances are distributed.) 
If the inheritance were a small one, then there would not be any 
justification in running up a large attorney's fee (like the one in this case), 
since the "amount involved" would make a large attorney fee unreasonable. 
The legal issue before the Supreme Court is, thus, whether an heir who 
has utilized genetic testing for purposes of establishing paternity for purposes 
of intestate succession under Utah Uniform Probate Code at UCA Sec. 75-2-
114 can recover attorneys fees from the estate under UCA Sec. 78-45a-5(4). 
It does not appear that any litigants other than the Madsens have tried 
to make the argument on appeal that it does provide such a basis under Utah 
statutes, and so this does present a question of first impression on this appeal. 
The Supreme Court should hold that the reference made in the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code at UCA Sec. 75-2-114 to the Utah Uniform Act on 
Paternity at Chapter 45a, Title 78, of the Utah Code does refer to the genetic 
testing procedures therein but does not provide for the award of attorney fees. 
-12-
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POINT FOUR 
In reply to the contentions in points 8 and 9 of the Madsens' 
brief, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of record require 
reversal and remand to satisfy the Estate ofOuinn requirements. 
The foregoing Point One through Point Three in this brief fully 
reply to points 1 though 7 of the Madsens' brief. Both Point 8 and 
Point 9 of the Madsen brief are hereby given a reply in this Point Four. 
Consistent with the "pragmatic" approach taken to finality of 
orders in probate matters, it is vitally important to have the Supreme 
Court now decide whether there is a statutory basis for a fee award. 
If there is no such basis, then that will conclude that matter. 
If there is one, then "pragmatic" considerations would make it 
helpful for the Supreme Court to reverse and remand with instructions 
to the probate court to wait on awarding any attorneys' fees until the 
probate nears conclusion and an assessment can be made under the 
Estate of Ouinn principles set forth in the estate's opening brief of the 
reasonableness of the fee in light of the value of inheritance thereby 
secured for Karly Madsen after administrative and other claims with 
priority are first paid and such an actual value can then be assessed and 
measured. None of that can yet be assessed or measured by the courts. 
-13-
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< 
The personal representative, the Madsens, and the courts lack 
the clairvoyance and the prescience needed to assess and measure what 
the value of any inheritances will be, because one property interest is 
still tied-up in litigation between third parties. (R.356) The late Kory 
Pasquin owned a partnership interest. Any payment from the surviving 
partners) in conjunction with an accounting for his partnership interest 
by the surviving partner or partners will not be received by the estate 
until litigation between third parties over that partnership has ended. 
Thus, whether or not $41,212.50 can be justified by the "amount 
involved" and the "results obtained" cannot yet be determined because 
that portion of the inheritance distribution is uncertain and unknowable. 
The "pragmatic" considerations in Utah law that govern whether 
to consider a matter on appeal or to send it back to the probate court 
where it can be revisited by the probate court, if necessary, strongly 
favor a remand. In doing so, the Supreme Court should instruct the 
probate court it is not precluded from revisiting matters so sent back to 
it "without prejudice" when there has been a change in the operative 
facts and/or where facts previously unknown and unknowable have 
become known. This will help promote orderly estate administration. 
-14-
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POINTFIVE 
In further reply to the contentions in points 8 and 9 of the 
Madsens' brief, the estate preserved all issues raised on appeal. 
The estate timely informed the probate court of its position that 
the proposed order awarding some $45,000 in attorney's fees and costs 
should be "rejected and not signed." (R.657) Had the court done what 
the estate asked, deficiencies concerning lack of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law would not have arisen in the probate court. Since 
the court did sign the order over the estate's objection, the estate may 
now raise on appeal all of the errors that were made by the probate 
court as a consequence of that signing over the estate's objection, 
including the lack of findings of fact or conclusions of law supporting 
either the $41,212,50 attorney fee award or the $3,933.25 cost award. 
In another timely filing well before the court signed the order, 
the estate pointed out its position that $41,212.50 in this "simple case" 
appeared "excessive" and an "assistant attorney general working the 
paternity calendar for recovery services could likely prepare such a 
case in an afternoon and try it in less than a day" since DNA testing 
was done before the Madsens' attorneys were retained and when the 
-15-
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Madsens' attorneys requested the test results "the estate stipulated the 
(DNA) tests could be released and the court so ordered." (R.665) 
The absence of conclusions of law (particularly as they relate to 
the absence of a statutory basis for the attorney fee award) was also 
preserved when the estate timely objected to the order well in advance 
of signing by riling the following objection to the attorney fee portion: 
"The Utah Uniform Probate Code contains no provision allowing 
attorney's fees to be claimed as part of the costs in this case, but allows 
only costs to be claimed. UCA Sec. 75-1-310 (1996)." (R.664) 
The need for adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
to the $3,933.25 cost award was also timely raised and preserved when 
the estate objected to the claimed costs in the probate court as follows: 
"(C)osts were not recoverable at common law and are generally 
allowable only in the amounts and in the manner provided by statute. 
Frampton v. Wilson. 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980V The'expert witness' 
testified that he was a custodian of state DNA testing records at the 
University of Utah and, therefore, as a records custodian, he could and 
should have been paid only the statutory witness fee. Further, the 
genetic testing statute in effect on the date of Kory Pasquin's death 
specifically provides that '(t)he fee of an expert witness called by a 
party but not appointed by the court shall not be taxed as costs in the 
action (emphasis added)' UCA Sec. 78-45a-9 (1996)." (R.664-665) 
All appeal issues were raised and preserved below and should be 
heard on appeal under the "pragmatic approach" used in Utah probate. 
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POINT SIX 
In reply to the contentions in points 9 and 10 of the Madsens' 
brief, Estate ofOuinn requires entry of a finding of fact stating an 
approximate amount of Karly Madsen's inheritance. The lack of 
any pragmatic perspective on the part of the Madsens and their 
counsel as to the relationship between attorney fees and costs and 
the amount of her inheritance is not a basis for an excessive award. 
The essence of the Madsens' arguments in points 9 and 10 of 
their brief is that the findings required under Matter of Estate of Ouinn. 
830 P.2d 282 (Ut. App. 1992), are "inherent" in the trial court's order. 
However, since even the approximate amount of Karly Madsen's 
inheritance is unknown and unknowable at this stage of the probate due 
to third-party litigation, it cannot yet be "inherent" in the court's order. 
Until it can be approximated, Estate of Ouinn cannot be applied. 
The Madsens and their counsel increased fees and costs by more 
than $40,000 over the $5000 that would be reasonable based on this: 
"Karly was required to incur substantially more in legal fees because 
the Estate has employed an endless series of complex legal tactics that 
constitute conduct perhaps exceeded only by that of the poisoning 
princes of the Medici family of Renaissance Italy."(Aplee. Brief p. 32) 
The failure to connect this subjective perspective on their part 
with the amount of Karly Madsen's inheritance makes this insufficient. 
This argument does not satisfy the Estate of Ouinn requirements. 
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Furthermore, even though it is the subjective claim of the Madsens and 
their counsel that this probate is a difficult one for them, the record shows no 
independent attempt by the probate court to characterize the fee as reasonable 
in light of any "endless" or "complex" legal tactics.1 This case is comparable 
to Morgan v. Morgan. 795 P.2d 684 (Ut.App. 1990). Even though a lawyer 
characterized the fees as reasonable in light of the difficulty of the case, the 
absence of an "an independent attempt by the court" to so characterize the 
fees required a remand for "reconsideration of the award of fees and for entry 
of such additional findings as may be necessary" and as to the costs awarded: 
"(W)itness fees, travel expenses, and service of process expenses are 
chargeable only in accordance with the fee schedule set by statute ."... 
"Witness compensation in excess of the statutory schedule is generally 
inappropriate as a cost."... (Payments to witnesses in excess of the statutory 
schedule amounts do not constitute) "legitimate and taxable 'costs'" (but are) 
"expenses"..."which may be ever so necessary, but are not taxable as costs." 
Thus, the attorney fee and cost award in this case should be reversed 
and remanded for "reconsideration of the award of fees" and costs "and for 
entry of such additional findings as may be necessary." The Supreme Court 
should also include a mandate directing the trial court to limit witness costs to 
only statutory witness fees, travel expenses, and subpoena service expenses. 
1
 It should be noted that the Medici princes were responsible for fostering a very great 
flowering of the arts in Florence and also had the good sense to fire and jail the amoral 
leadership guru Machiavelli. If the personal representative's counsel's stamina and skill 
enabled him to employ endless and complex legal tactics comparable to those employed 
by historic personages, that is no small thing. However, since the trial court made no 
such finding, it appears the Madsens and their counsel are employing overdramatization 
in this matter. Further, since any such legal tactics successfully fended-off very vexatious 
litigation by the Madsens (such as their attempts to pursue discovery into the sex life of 
the estate's personal representative), it was good any such tactics were successfully used. 
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As set forth earlier in this brief, there is no provision for an attorney 
fee award in the probate code when the parent-child relationship is pled in a 
petition filed within an informal probate and is then adjudicated for intestate 
succession purposes only. The reference to the genetic testing and other 
provisions of Chapter 45 a of Title 78 could be used to establish intestate 
succession from a child to a parent or from a parent's ancestor to a child just 
as easily as it could be used as a basis for parent to child intestate succession. 
Further, recovery from a father's estate is limited even in a paternity 
action. The court should hold there is no statutory basis for a fee award. 
In the event that the court holds that the reference to Chapter 45a of 
Title 78 incorporates more than just the genetic testing and other paternity 
establishment procedures therein, and incorporates the attorney fee provision 
therein, then the Chapter 45a reference to UCA Sec. 30-3-3 when stating the 
manner in which attorney's fees may be awarded would come into play. In 
that case, the court's failure to make findings of fact concerning the attorney 
fee award's reasonableness as required under Estate of Quinn also runs afoul 
of the cases which require findings of fact under Sec. 30-3-3 fee award cases. 
Under those cases, the court must make findings of fact concerning the 
receiving party's need, the paying party's ability to pay, the reasonableness of 
the fee, and the subsidiary "earned income ratios" of the parties against which 
such determinations are made. Rehn v. Rehn. 974 P.2d 306 (Ut.App. 1998). 
While "earned income ratios" are not a very good fit in a probate, it is 
clear that Sec. 30-3-3 would at least require a specific finding of fact as to the 
amount of Karly Madsen's inheritance on which to base need, ability to pay, 
and reasonableness. Reversal and remand are required under Sec. 30-3-3 so 
the trial court can do a Sec. 30-3-3 analysis based on the inheritance amount. 
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Another Madsen argument that warrants a brief reply is the raw 
comparison between their fee and cost claim of over $45,000 with some 
$40,000 in fees and costs allegedly incurred by the personal representative. 
The Madsens refer to both numbers and then claim it is "ludicrous" for 
the estate to even question their fees and costs. In so doing, the Madsens are 
engaging in a written equivalent of raising one's voice rather than improving 
the quality of one's arguments, since the record shows that the personal 
representative had to retain legal counsel for a number of other legal matters.2 
The raw comparison is, thus, pointless, meaningless, and gratuitous. 
2
 The fatal accident in which Kory Pasquin was allegedly operating a speedboat while 
intoxicated also caused serious personal injuries to his passenger, who asserted a formal 
claim against the estate. Counsel for the personal representative successfully defended 
the estate in a manner that caused the claim to be withdrawn. A lawsuit was filed against 
the estate asserting a claim to one-third of shares of stock that had been owned by Kory 
Pasquin. The personal representative had her counsel secure summary judgment in favor 
the estate. An attempt by the losing party to perfect an appeal was not successful and the 
Utah Court of Appeals declined to set aside the trial court's summary judgment in favor 
of the estate. An attempt by the losing party to then have the Utah Supreme Court take 
the case was denied. Geri Pasquin v. Estate of Kory Pasquin, et aL cert denied. January 
26,2000, Utah Supreme Court Docket No. 990823. The subject shares have now been 
distributed to the three children identified as heirs so far, subject to rights retained by the 
estate in the event they are needed to satisfy superior claims or to satisfy claims of equal 
priority on a pro rata basis. It should be noted that the same lawsuit also still seeks a 
portion of a partnership interest Kory Pasquin owned and is still pending between third 
parties. Although the estate is no longer a party, future payment to the estate for Kory 
Pasquin's partnership interest by the surviving partner or partners cannot be computed or 
paid to the estate until that litigation is concluded. The final amount of Karly Madsen's 
inheritance is, therefore, both unknown and unknowable. These and other matters caused 
the personal representative to reasonably incur legal fees beyond those incurred due to 
Kristie Madsen's petition to have Karly Madsen adjudicated to be a an heir. The personal 
representative has not yet sought any reimbursement out of estate property for the legal 
fees and costs she has incurred in performing her duties. Raw comparison between the 
Madsens' legal fees for a single matter (where their initial success in getting "half1 of the 
estate was eventually reversed) with the personal representative's legal fees for a number 
of additional matters (in which the estate fully prevailed) does not advance the analysis. 
-20-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Madsens' brief then lists various criteria that the courts should use 
in evaluating the reasonableness of a fee and asserts that the probate court 
must have used these, even though no such evaluation process by the court is 
even minimally revealed in the probate court's fee and cost order. 
The probate court would have been unable to reasonably assess either 
the amount involved in the case or the result achieved because the amount of 
Karly Madsen's inheritance was and is still unknown and unknowable. 
It was an abuse of discretion for the probate court to attempt to assess 
the reasonableness of the fees and costs without first determining the amount 
of Karly Madsen's inheritance so that this could be used as a yardstick. 
POINTSEVEN 
The sudden appearance of Yvettte Madsen as a party on appellees' brief 
is simply another example of how this case was made difficult not by 
any complex legal tactics on the part of the estate, but by the Madsens' 
counsel's utter failure to distinguish between an informal probate and a 
civil lawsuit in their court filings and their use of the informal probate 
as a repository for all kinds of filings wholly unrelated to paternity. 
Kory Pasquin had denied paternity as to Karly Madsen during his 
lifetime, even after DNA test results were obtained. Since Kristie Madsen 
never named Kory Pasquin as Karly Madsen's father on Karly Madsen's birth 
certificate, and since, even after obtaining some DNA test results, she never 
obtained either an adjudication of paternity or a court-approved agreement of 
paternity as required under the Utah Uniform Probate Code, the personal 
representative properly excluded Karly Madsen as a child and heir in the 
initial informal probate filings. This was both legally correct and prudent. A 
DNA test result is not a valid substitute for a birth certificate or a court order. 
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I 
Yet, instead of simply filing and litigating a proceeding to establish 
Karly Madsen's legal status as a child and heir, Kristie Madsen started off 
right out of the chute by adding filings that called Candance M. Souter a liar 
for not including Karly Madsen as a child and heir of Kory Pasquin in the 
initial informal probate filing. Kristie Madsen's attorneys then proceeded to 
use the informal probate case file as a repository for various and sundry 
petitions and affidavits from the likes of Geri Pasquin and Julie Flarity which 
also did nothing to move the threshold issue of paternity forward, but instead 
continued to attack Candance M. Souter about her informal application for 
appointment, which they claimed was "false" for not naming Karly Madsen 
as a child and heir and with more unkind allegations that they did not support 
with anything concrete. Even though she is not a party below, yet another 
Madsen has now emerged on appeal claiming to be a party and to speak for 
the minor child Karly Madsen and has proceeded where the others left-off 
with allegations of "endless" and "complex" legal tactics by Ms. Souter. 
An informal probate is not an open-ended repository for the filing of 
anything and everything. It is also not a civil lawsuit. Normally, one must 
proceed therein by petition, not by motion. If a legal dispute arises within the 
probate between parties with standing therein, it is then resolved according to 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as between the parties with standing, and 
is not an open file for the filing of papers by anyone who cares to come along 
and file something. Instead of simply focusing on the very simple threshold 
question of paternity after the filing of Kristie Madsens' petition on that point, 
Kristie Madsen's attorneys continued to beat this worn drum well into the 
next year. On October 30, 1998, an attorney for Kristie Madsen (who then 
inexplicably claimed to represent only Julie Flarity and Karly Madsen, but 
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not Kristie Madsen) told a Third District Judge that some as yet unidentified 
"we" were still complaining about same: "We have serious concerns about 
representations she made to the Court in her informal application for 
appointment, which we think are false." (T.4, October 30, 1998 hearing.) 
The judge gently reminded counsel that the first order of business was 
to resolve the threshold question of paternity to establish some standing and 
that Karly Madsen had not yet been legally adjudicated to be a child and heir. 
To the extent that the spectacle of having persons claiming to speak for 
"little" Karly Madsen shuffle in and out of this case in the probate court and 
on appeal has increased her attorney's fees, it is not reasonable to require the 
estate to pay them. To the extent that parties who are before the court for the 
purpose of establishing paternity want to spend their attorney time beating 
their drum well into the next year about "serious concerns" they have based 
on their belief that it was "false" for the personal representative to decline to 
include in her initial probate filing someone who did not appear as a child of 
Kory Pasquin on any official birth record or in any court adjudication, the 
estate should not have to pay for the attorney time they spent on this pursuit. 
Since the probate court awarded every last dime of attorneys' fees 
requested, and since that request culled-out only the time spent on Julie 
Flarity's non-paternity filings and activities, but not on the non-paternity 
filings and activities unrelated to Julie Flarity, a remand is now required to 
allow the probate court to cull-out all attorney time unrelated to paternity. 
Only those filings and activities by lawyers that moved the issue of 
paternity towards a legal conclusion should be included in any fee award, 
and, as set forth previously in this brief, that should happen only if the 
appellate court concludes that an attorney fee award has a statutory basis. 
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POINT EIGHT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ABIDE BY HER OWN 
ORDER AS TO FEES AND COSTS AND INAPPROPRIATE 
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF "LAW OF THE CASE" 
WHERE THE OPERATIVE FACTS HAD CHANGED PRECLUDES 
THE APPLICATION OF ESTOPPEL SOUGHT BY THE MADSENS. 
In further reply to the Madsens' arguments in their brief concerning 
various forms of estoppel, after "Pasquin I" was duly dismissed without 
prejudice, the probate court proceeded by reassuming jurisdiction and by 
promptly entering an order indicating that issues regarding attorney fees and 
costs were yet to be briefed and argued to her. Thereafter, at the urging of 
the Madsens, she improperly vacated that order and reinstated the earlier 
attorney fee order appealed in "Pasquin I" (dismissed without prejudice). 
Since the operative facts had changed (the Madsens had given-up on 
the untenable award of "half of the estate to Karly Madsen), it was error to 
reinstate the prior fee and cost award without entering new findings of fact 
and conclusions of law justifying the failure to make a new attorney fee and 
cost award. Just as court action on attorney fees requires entry of findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, inaction (such as the failure to reconsider after a 
change in operative facts) also requires findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. For example, when a court declines to make an attorney fee award and 
requires each side to bear its costs and attorney fees, the court must make 
findings of fact to justify this. Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438 (Ut.App. 1998) 
Once "Pasquin I" was dismissed without prejudice, Karly Madsen 
faced one of two outcomes: (1) Additional (court-ordered) DNA testing 
would establish paternity as to both Karly Madsen and Kody Marion (which 
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it did); (2) Additional court-ordered DNA testing would exclude paternity as 
to Kody Marion, which would leave Karly Madsen still exposed to appellate 
review of her failure to call as a foundation witness at trial a "lab technician... 
to...testify as to the chain of custody of the blood samples drawn ..." State 
Dept. of Social Services v, Woods, 742 P.2d 118 (UtApp. 1987) In either 
case, her claim to "half the estate could no longer stand unless and until the 
claims of any other children (and any women claiming to be married to Kory 
Pasquin who might also come forward) were barred. Accordingly, the 
probate court should never have vacated the order wherein she indicated she 
would look at attorney fees after the "Pasquin I" dismissal, and there simply 
is no basis under this record for imposing any kind of appellate estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should hold that it was an abuse of discretion for 
the probate court to review the attorney fee and cost claim for reasonableness 
without first finding and expressly stating the approximate amount of Karly 
Madsen's inheritance, it should hold that the probate court's findings of fact 
are inadequate to facilitate appellate review, it should hold that witness costs 
should be limited to statutory service of subpoena, mileage, and witness fees, 
it should hold there is no statutory basis for an attorney fee award, it should 
then reverse and remand the entire fee and cost award, it should also award 
costs, and it should awaj^3amages to tne estate in a sufficiently large sumT^ 
DATED THIS OTH DAY ©F JULY, 2001. ^ ^ 
NtQBEWartOPIER 
Attorne^for Candance M. Souter 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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David W. Steffensen 
Attorney for Karly Madsen and Yvette Madsen 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100, SLC UT 84106 
Michael E. Day 
Attorney for Sheri Marion 
45 East Vine Street, Murray/OT 84107 
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